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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The lower court ruled that the Plaintiff/Appellant had
not established prima facie case that a contract consisting
between Plaintiff/Appellant and Defendants/Respondents and
entered Judgment for no cause of action against the Plaintiff/
Appellant seeks to tbve the lower coures Judgment affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or shortly before September 30, 1971, Plaintiff/
Appellant Ned

Gregerson approached

Defendant/Respondant

James Jensen to inquire into the purchase of some land held by
Jensen in Gunnison, Utah.
hereinafter T)

llA:l9-20.

(Transcript of court proceedings
Gregerson was interested in

establishing a dental practice in Gunnison, where he was
reared.

T 10:11,12, 25-30; 28:7-15.

Contact was first made at the service station that Jensen
manages in Gunnison.

T llA:l9-20; 44:25-26.

At that time

Gregerson and his father tried to talk Jensen into selling the
land by telling Jensen that they would assist him to establish
an Amway business which would allow him to retire in five years.
T 45:1-7,19-24; 46:18-28.
Shortly thereafter, Jensen and Gregerson went out to
examine the property in question.

T 47:1.

Jensen owned only
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one piece of land in the area.

(finding of fact no. 5)

Jensen's home was located on the southern portion of the lot
and the northern portion was being used as pasture.
T 38:8-9.

T 26:10-14;

Jensen would only consider selling a piece of the

pasture land, since his drain field and cesspool extended into
that area.

T 46:6-13; 47:2-4.

Jensen indicated to Gregerson

the piece of the pasture land he thought he would be willing
to sell by kicking the dirt at a spot on the land that he
presumed to be beyond the point of possible interference with
his cesspool and drain fields. T 46:6-13.
Preliminary negotiations ensued at Jensen's home in which
Gregerson agreed to pay $700 for property to the north of the area
where Jensen kicked the dirt. T 48:11-19.

Jensen was willing

if Gregerson would establish his dental practice on the property,
which would enhance the value of Jensen's land,

(T 51:17-25)

and if Jensen was able to get a partial release of the mortgage
on the whole of his property.

T 59:10-lG; 30:2-5; 49:21-22.

Gregerson at that time gave Jensen a cn2ck ot $350 to hold the
property,

(T 17:23-30) which Jensen deposited in the bank.

T 60:16-22.

The check now appears with the following inscription

in Gregerson's handwriting "1/2 payment on land as agreed other
1/2 payment when deed delivered."

(Plaintiff Exhibit NO. 1)
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Gregerson, at the time of these preliminary negotiations
was concerned about obtaining a legal description of the
property. T 15:7-8.

Jensen produced a tax notice which

contained a legal description of the entire piece of property
owned by Jensen, but no description existed of any divided
portion of the entire piece.
Designation of

T 15:9-24: 4:23-27.

See also,

Record on Appeal No. 18.

Gregerson and his father took the tax notice and later
went to measure the land along with a local builder, Don Anderson.
T 38:14-22.

Jensen was interested in verfying the description

on the tax notice to insure that sufficient land was actually there
to provide for a dental clinic.

T 40:29-30; 41:14-26.

However

the depth of the lot to the point where Jensen had kicked the
dirt was not described in the tax notice.

see, Designation

of Record on Appeal No. 18.
Shortly thereafter Gregerson returned to the army base
in Texas where he was sarving in the military.

T 20:12-13, 24-25.

Jensen understood that Gregerson was going to return to Gunnison
in December of 1971, after he was discharged from the army, to
complete negotiations and commence construction of a dental
clinic on the property.

T 49:12-15; 51:28-30.

During the

interim period, following preliminary negotiations, the bank
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
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in Gunnison prepared a deed for conveyance of the property
to

Gregerson.

T 50:17-29.

However, Jensen, on the advise

of the bank, did not execute the deed prior to

Gregerson's

return in

December since no survey had been made of the

property,

T 52:21-31; 51:1-4, and the deed had been prepared

at the request of someone other than Jensen.

T 50:17-19.

Jensen assumed that the deed was prepared at Gregerson's
request.

T 50:17-19.

Gregerson, subsequently decided to establish his dental
clinic in Cedar city rather than Gunnison.
23:1-5.

Jensen offered to give

T 22:18-19;

Gregerson his money back, but

Gregerson wanted the money plus interest, and refused Jensen's
offer.

T 51:10-12.

Gregerson commenced a suit for specific performance of a
land sales contract, which was tried September 27, 1978.
court, after hearing

The

Gregerson's argument, dismissed the claim

on the basis that there was no description of the land which
the court could specifically enforce.

T 74:14-21; 76:7-12.

However, the court did order Jensen to return the

$350 deposit

with interest.
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Gregerson moved for a new trial on the basis that Jensen
allegedly failed to reply completely to Interrogatory No. 14
which asked the following:
"INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please state whether
or not any other written documents exist concerning
the property described in Interrogatory No. 2 between
Plaintiff and Defendants which were written or
prepared on or about September 30th, 1971. If
the answer to this is in the affirmative, please
attach a copy of said instrument."
Jensen's response did not recognize the existence of the
unsigned deed prepared by the bank.
"INTERROGATORY NO. 14:
ANSWER: In answer
to Interrogatory No. 14, there are not any documents
that exist regarding the sale of said property."
(Designation of Record on Appeal No.8).
The trial court denied the motion on the following basis:
"That the existance of an unsigned document not
prepared by the Defendant would still not make a prima
:t;acie case for Plaintiff."
(Court Order dated
January 1st, 1979; Designation of Record on Appeal
No. 24).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DECIDED THAT THE
CANCELLED CHECK BEARING NO DESCRIPTION OF
THE LAND TO BE CONVEYED IS NOT A SUFFICIENT
MEMORANDUM TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
utah Supreme

court decisions dated from 1915 have

held that no memorandum is sufficient to satisfy the

consistentl~

Statute

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-5- Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of Frauds unless it contains all of the essential terms of the
alleged agreement.

The cases make it clear that a description

of the property to be conveyed is one of the essential terms
required.
In Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P 465 (1915) the
plaintiff, M. Louisa Adams, as executrix of the estate of
D.C. Adams, sued to enjoin the continued trespass of the
defendant, Manning, on lands which had been owed by the decedant.
At trial Manning produced a receipt which he claimed to have
received from the decedant.

The receipt read as follows:

"october 19, 1901. Received of H.W. Manning
thirty dollars $301 as part payment of thirty
acres of ~and.
Pr~ce to be $100 for said land.
D.C. Adams
In reversing the decision of the district court the Utah
Supreme

Cour~

held that

[u]nder all the authorities, the memorandum here
in question is insufficient to take the alleged
sale out of the statute of frauds for the reason
that there is no sufficient or any description of
the land alleged to be sold.
148 P at 466.
The memorandum in the Adams case is, if anything, more
descriptive of the :and in question than is the check in the
instant case.

Although the receipt offered in evidence by

Manning did not fully describe the land he occupied, it did

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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state that thirty acres were involved.

The check in the

present case makes no mention of either the quantity or the
location of the land alleged to have been sold.
In more recent cases the Utah Supreme Court has emphasized
by repetition that a memorandum must include all the essential
terms of the alleged contract.
The court held in collete v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231
P2d 730, 732 (1951) that "the written memorandum which is relied
on to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the essential
terms and provisions of the contract •••

The memorandum must

show what the contract was, and not merely note the fact that
some contract was made."

Again in Eckard v. Smith, 527 P2d

660, 662 (Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme court held that
Specific performance cannot be granted unless
the terms are clear, and that clarity must be
found from the language used in the document.
In Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242
P2d 578, 580 (1952), a case dealing with a lease agreement,
the same court decided that "[i)t is fundamental that the
memorandum which is relied on to satisfy the statute of frauds
must contain all the essential terms and provisions of the
contract."
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After making this abstract statement of law the Birdzell
decision listed the essential provisions of a lease agreement:
"First, a definite agreement as to the extent and boundaries
of the property to be leased ••• "

242 P2d at 580.

If a

memorandum of a lease contract must contain the "extent and
boundaries of the property," surely a land sale contract would
be subject to the same requirement.
In zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P2d 1319 (Utah 1975)
the utah Supreme Court considered the question of whether an
endorsed check was c sufficient memorandum to comply with the
Statutes of Frauds.
After

signi~1

a

:alld written contract in January, 1973

for the sale of realty the parties allegedly modified the
written contract by oral agreement.

The Plaintiff presented

an endorsed and cancelled check which bore the handwritten
notation "as per agreement of 12-8-73" as proof of the
modification.
Utah Supreme

In holding the memorandum to be inadequate the
Court said that

any such modifying agreement must be sufficiently
certain and unequivocal in its terms that the
parties will understand what it is and what is
to be done under it. Neither the check nor the
quoted notation thereon make any such recitals and
they do not meet the re0uirement.
538 P2d at 1322.
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Dictum in the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Adams v.
Manning, 46 Utah 82 148 P 465, 467 (1915) is a further illustration
of the principle that a cancelled check which contains no
description of the land in question does not constitute a
sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

After

concluding that the receipt signed by Adams was not an adequate
memorandum because there was "no sufficient or any description
of the land alleged to have been sold," the court made the
following statement:
If it can be said that a contract of sale is established
in this case, we may meet tomorrow with a case where
the alleged purchases issued and delivered to the
alleged vendor a check on which the former wrote the
words "part payment of ten acres of land," and in
view that the alleged vendor has _endorsed the check
and received the money and then has died, the alleged
purchases produces the check and endorsement, and in
connection therewith claims he took possession, constructive or otherwise, of the land alleged to have
been sold, and asks and is given specific performance
if he will pay the remainder of the purchase price
whatever it may be. What becomes of the Statute of
Frauds under such circumstances.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT AN UNSIGNED
DEED WHICH WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE vmEN THE
ALLEGED LEGAL MEMORANDUM WAS FORMED, WAS
NOT REFERRED TO IN THE MEMORANDUM, AND WAS
NOT PREPARED BY THE DEFENDANT, WOULD NOT
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
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Modern jurisdictions are divided on the question of whether
an unsigned writing not referred to in the memorandum may be
used to supplement the memorandum.

Some jurisdiction absolutely

refused to allow an unsigned writing to augment a signed
memorandum unless the signed statement makes an express
reference to the supplementary document.

See for example

Irvine v. Haniotis, 208 Okla 1, 252 P2d 470, 472 (1953).
These jurisdictions will not admit parol evidence to show a
link between the signed and the unsigned papers.

Other

jurisdictions allow two writings to unitedly form the memorandum
which satisfies the statute.

See for example Grant v. Avvil,

39 Wash 2d 722, 238 P2d 393, 395 (1952).

These jurisdictions

of the second class require that either parol evidence or an
express reference establish that the two documents constitute
one memorandum.
Even where a signed paper contains an internal
reference to an unsigned one, almost always some
parol testimony is necessary to aid in the
identification. There is ample authority holding
that it is admissible for this purpose. The words
of reference need not be sufficient in themselves;
they are required only to the extent that they are
necessary to prevent successful fraud and perjury.
In a case where the court is convinced that there
is no serious danger of such fraud and perjury, the
words of reference may be wholly dispensed with
without violating either the words or the spirit
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of the statue. • .
If from the documents and the
supplementary parol evidence the court is not
convinced that no fraud is being perpetrated, it
may properly refuse enforcement and throw the
burden of this result upon the statute of frauds.
2 Corbin on contracts § 515 (1963)
Regardless of which approach the court chooses to follow,
the deed in question is not sufficient to satisfy the Statutes
of Frauds.

Obviously the first alternative bars any use of the

unsigned memorandum to show that a contract existed.

Moreover,

even if the court adopts the second position, the deed is
inadequate because there has been no showing that any parol
evidence exists to prove that the two documents from one
memorandum.

Both Gregerson and Jensen have denied under oath

that they had anything to do with preparing the deed.
30:19-29.

T 50:17-29,

Furthermore, Gregerson has not provided any evidence

from any source either at trial or in his motion for a new trial
that would prove that either party intended that the deed
memorialize a contract between the parties.
There are no Utah cases that consider the question of
whether an unsigned writing may supplement a signed memorandum
and remedy its defects.

However, both the Restatement of

contracts and Williston on Contracts recognize that under
extraordinary circumstances such a supplement will be allowed.
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Nevertheless, neither of these authorities on contract law
would allow an unsigned memorandum to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds in the present case.
4 Williston on

Contracts §§ 582, 583 (3rd ed 1961) report

cases that illustrate the liberal doctrine which would allc'rl
an unsigned document to supplement a signed memorandum.
Williston criticizes the decisions that have accepted

th~

liberal doctrine because it nullifies any protection which the
Statute of Frauds provides:
It seems difficult to justify this extension of the
doctrine in regard to several documents. There is
no difficulty in making out a written memorandum that
evidently relates to the same transaction, but the
memorandum is not signed by the party to be charged.
A simple illustcration will indicate this. A writes
a letter to B, saying:
"I will sell you the property
of which we spoke yesterday for $5,000 cash." B replies:
"I understand that you will sell me the following
described property of which we spoke yesterday
(describing the property) at $5,000 cash. I hereby
accept your proposition." According to the doctrine
here criticized B's reply could be read with A's
letter to charge A; they evidently refer to the same
transaction, and the description of the property
contained in B's letter could be incorporated in A;s
~riting.
But it is obvious that A has never
authenticated the description by his signature, and
to allow the description written by B to be used by B
in enforcing the contract against A, is nothing
other than to allow B to write an essential term of the
memorandum himself and charge A with it as written.
This criticism has particular relevance to the instanc
case.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-12- OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

If utah law enforced the claims of every purchaser of land who
had first made partial payment by cancelled check and who then
relied on a separate deed for the description of the land - a
deed that was not signed by the grantor, which did not exist
when the check was delivered, and which was not referred to by
the check - the opportunity to create a bargain would attract
innumerable composers of false deeds and allow the almost total
emasculation of the Statute of Frauds.
Section 208, comment d, of the

Restatement (second) of

Contracts reads as follows:
d. Reference to future writings. Ordinarily a
signature does not authenticate a document not in
existence at the time the signature is made. But
when several documents are executed by different
parties in a single transaction, the signature of
one may have reference to a subsequent signature
of another. In some such cases the earlier
signature may be adopted with reference to a
document prepared later, whether signed by anyone
or not. In other cases the reference is to an
event of independent significance, or to the
exercise of a power granted by the signer. Thus
a signed offer authenticates the acceptance invited
by it.
Illustrations:
6. A and B enter into a contract within the
Statute and sign a memorandum, otherwise sufficient,
stating that the price to be paid shall be the same
as the price agreed upon by C and D in a similar
contract expected to be made on the following day"
The memorandum is sufficient if it accurately states
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-13-OCR, may contain errors.

the entire agreement between A and B. The
contract made between c and D is an event of
independent significance, and may be referred
to for the price whether or not there is a
memorandum signed by c or D.
7. A and B enter into an oral contract for
the purchase and sale of a tract of land and sign
a memorandum, otherwise sufficient, stating that
the contract is "contingent upon A's ability to
arrange $7,000 purchase money mortgage." A
subsequently applies in writing to a financial
institution for such a mortgage loan on specific
terms as to duration, interest rate and payment.
The mortgage loan application may be read with the
memorandum to satisfy the statute against either
party.

I

In the present case if the warranty deed were executed the

I

I

I

I

parties to the conveyance would be the same persons that had
signed and endorsed the check.

Moreover, the drafting of the

deed is not an event of independent significance.

Therefore,

I

I

commend d, the general rule bars the deed because it is a

I

document that was not in existence at the time that the check

I

since the deed does not fall under either of the exceptions of

was signed.
Appellant relies on Jacobson v. cox, 202 P2d 714 (Utah 1949)
and stauffer v. call (Supreme court of the state of Utah, filed
January 9th, 1979, case No. 15468) to show that the court in the
instant case ought to arrive at an appropriate description of the
land for the parties in dispute.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I
I

However, in the Jacobson case the land in question was
described in the original contract by reference to natural
boundaries and fences such

th~t

could be easily remedied.

The court therefore decided that

misdescription in the record

the case should be taken out of the

Statutes of Frauds based

on the following standard:
A Description is sufficient if when read in the
light of the circumstances of possession, ownership,
situation of the parties, and their relation to
each other and to the property, as they were when
the negotiations took place and the writing was
made, it identifies the property. A description is
sufficient, although vague in respect of the
boundaries, if it identifies a specific tract of
land when applied to the facts on the surface of the
earth, as where a surveyor, with the contract in his
hands and with the aid of no other means than those
provided, could go to the place stated therein and
accurately located the land. A~erican Jurisprudence
Section 348, Volume 49, Statutes of Frauds, in dealing
with the subject of uncertainty in deeds states.
Application of this standard to the contract at hand clearly
shows that the description did not take it out of the Statute of
Frauds.

The only description on the contract was "land as agreed".

Could anyone accurately locate the land based on the contractual
description, as the standard requires?

Moreover, if the land

were described in the contract it would have to be described with
reference to the unmarked spot where respondant kicked the dirt
some eight years ago.
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Appellant, Gregerson, also relies heavily on the case
Stauffer v. Call (Supreme court of the State of utah,

filed

January 9th, 1979, case No. 15468) to establish that the
warranty deed in the present case satisfies the Statutes of
Frauds.

'l'he Stauffer casE;!·· is irrelevant for that purpose.

Specific performance was decreed in the Stauffer case because
the Plaintiff's part performance (possession and improvement)
took the case out of the Statute of

Frauds.

The court made

no holding that the statute was satisfied.
"They [plaintiffs] made as sellers concede, substantial
improvemeRts to the two houses in which they lived
The taking of possession and the payment of $6,400
towards the full price takes ~he matter out of the
statute of frauds."
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ACTS OF PART PERFORMANCE
WERE INSUFFICIENT TO REMOVE THE ALLEGED
CONTRACT FROM THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
In the case of Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah ·205, 293 P. 7,10
(1930) the utah Supreme court enunciated bhe elements of a
prima facie case of part performance as follows:
The law is well settled in the state that,
before a court can decree specific performance
of an oral gift of land, it must appear by
evidence that is clear, convincing, and
unequivocal:
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(l) That there was a parol grant or gift £y
a contract or agreement which must be complete
and certain in its terms;
(2) possession taken and improvement, made by the
donee pursuant to and in reliance on such oral gift;
(3) that the improvements so made are substantial •••
(4) strong equities in favor of the donee, so strong
that it would amount to a fraud upon him to allow
the statute to be interpreted to defeat his claim.
293 P. at 10
Although the concise Boland summary came from a case which
involved an oral gift of land rather than an oral contract,
holdings from other Utah Supreme Court decisions (presented
below) combined with the language of element number one of the
Boland test above (parol grant or gift by a contract or agreement) conclusively show that the same four requirements apply
to oral contracts as well.
The recent supreme court opinion in the case of Holmgren
Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P2d 611 (Utah 1975) reiterates the
first requirements of the Boland test; that the terms of the oral
contract must be complete and certain.

The court held that "the

oral contract and its terms must be clear, definite, mutually
understood, and established by clear, unequivocal and definite
testimony, or other evidence of the same quality."
614.

534 P2d at

See also Campbell v. Nelson, 101 Utah 523, 125 P2d 413

(1942).
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Other Utah Supreme

court decisions have held that the

Plaintiff who seeks specific performance of an oral contract
must "establish the terms thereof with a greater degree of
certainty than is required in an action at law."
74 utah 290, 279 P 504 (1929).

Clark v. Clark,

See also christensen v.

Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P2d 101 (1959).

Since legal

enforcement of an oral contract for the sale of realty is not
available in Utah.

Baugh v. Darley, 112 utah 1, 184 P2d 335

(1957): McKinnon v. Corporation, Etc., Latter-day Saints, 529
P2d 434 (Utah 1974), plaintiffs must establish the oral
contracts with the "greater clarity" which the clark and
Christensen cases require in order to qualify for any judical
remedy.
In Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P2d 570 (1953)
Chief Justice Wolfe explained the requirements of possession
and the substantial improvements as follows:
Some jurisdictions hold that possession is an
indispensible element,
while others indicate
the possession is only ordinarily necessary .•••
We do not pass on this point. However, assuming
acts in the nature of general improvements are
sufficient without the element of possession,
when it is lacking this court must be convinced
that no reasonable doubt exists as to whether or
not the acts of improvement are explainable on some
basis other than the hypothesis of an oral contract.
260 P2d at 580.
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one year after Ravarino the Utah Supreme Court made it
clear that possession and improvements are part of a prima
facie case of part performance in utah.

The opinion of the

court in Roth v. Roth, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P2d 278, 281 held that
"acts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the
contract in that the possession of the party seeking specific
performance and the improvements made by him must be reasonably
explicable only on the postulate that a contract exists ••• "
The record of the instant case contains no evidence that
appellant ever took possession of the Jensen land or that he made
any improvements on the land whatsoever.
The utah Supreme court opinion in Madsonia Realty co. v.
zion's Savings Bank & Trust co., 123 Utah 327, 259 P2d 595 (1953)
reiterated the fourth requirement listed in Boland; that the
equities of the alleged parol contract so favor the promisee
that he would be defrauded if the Statute of Frauds barred his
claim.

The court concluded that

part performance which will avoid the statute of frauds
may consist of any act which puts the party performing
in such a position that non-performance by the other
would constitute fraud.
259 P2d at 602.
More recent Supreme court decisions have held that the mere
refusal of alleged promise to perform an alleged oral contract
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cannot constitute the fraud which is necessary.
Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P2d 332, 335 (1956)

In Easton v.
the Court

decided that
A mere refusal to perform an oral agreement within
the statute, however is not such fraud as will
justify a court in disregarding the Statute even
though it results in hardship to the plaintiff •••
And that mere loss of a good bargain is not enough
to estop defendant from setting up the statute of
frauds as a defense to an action on a contract.
The same court's opinion is McKinnon v. Corporation, Etc.
Latter-day Saints, 529 P2d 434,

(Utah 1974) held that

Fraud, generally cannot be predicated upon the
failure to perform a promise or contract which
is unforceable under the statute of frauds, for
the promisor has not, in a legal sense, made a
contract; and therefore, he has the right, both
in law and in equity to refuse to perform.
Since the trial court in the present case has already held
that the appellant will receive a repayment of his down payment
with interest, there is no loss which he will suffer other than
the loss of his bargain.
The decision of Hogan v. Swayze, 65 Utah 435, 237 P 1097,
1103 (1925)

is one illustration of facts which state a prima

facie case for part performance of an oral contract.

In that case

the Utah Supreme Court held that
The written contract, as modified by the oral agreement, is definite, certain, and specific in all its
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terms.
It constitutes a valid contract for the
purchase of the east half of the land in question.
Plaintiff paid the full purchase price, and with the
knowledge and consent of the vendors, entered into
possession and made valuable improvements thereon.
The facts of the instant case differs from those in Hogan
and fall short of the requirements of Boland in that
The parol agreement is not clear.
Appellant did not take possession of the
land in question at any time.
(3)
Appellant made no improvements on the land.
(4)
Appellant will not be the victim of any fraud
if the contract is not enforced.
( l)
( 2)

CONCLUSION
In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P2d 811 (Utah 1972), the Utah
Supreme court defined the appellant's burden:
(d]ue to the advantaged position of the trial court,
in close proximity to the parties and the witnesses,
there is indulged a presumption of correctness of
his findings and judgment, with the burden upon the
appellant to show they were in error; and where the
evidence is in conflict, we do not upset his findings
merely because we may have reviewed the matter
differently, but do so only if evidence clearly preponderates against them. 495 P2d at 812.
Gregerson failed to meet the burden for the following
reasons:
l.

Under well established Utah law a cancelled check

',hich contains no description of the land involved cannot
constltute a sufficient memorandum of a land sales contract to
sotjsfy the Statute of

Frauds.
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2.

The existence of an unsigned deed not prepared by the

defendant, not referred to in the alleged memorandum, and not in
existence when the contract was allegedly entered, could have
no bearing on the outcome of this case.
3.

Without taking possession of the land or making any

improvements on it, partial payment under an alleged land sales
contract does not constitute partial performance sufficient to
remove the alleged agreement from the Statute of Frauds.
Therefore, the trial court appropriately dismissed the
plaintiff's cause of action and denied the motion for a new
trial.
DATED this

~ day of September, 1979.
submitted,

Attorney for Defendants/Respondents,
JAMES L. JENSEN and NEDRA
JENSEN, his wife
P. o. Box U
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Brigham City, utah 84302
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